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SPECIFIC INCIDENT POLYGRAPH TESTING
UNDER THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH
PROTECTION ACT OF 1988
Abstract.- The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 was enacted to protect private individuals from unjust termination or denial of job opportunities resulting from
unwarranted polygraph tests. The Act, however, allows private employers to continue
using polygraphs as part of "ongoing investigations" of employee misconduct. This Comment examines the ambiguous language of this exemption that courts will encounter when
determining whether employers have violated the Act. The Comment proposes that,
unless legislative history or federal regulations indicate otherwise, ambiguities in the specific incident exemption should be broadly construed to avoid employer liability.

The Employee Polygraph Protection Act ("EPPA") prohibits
employers from requiring or requesting that any employee or job
applicant take a lie detector test.1 The Act was effective December 27,
1988, and addresses Congressional concerns that individuals were
being unjustly terminated or denied employment because of employers' abuses of lie detector tests.2 However, the Act completely
exempts governmental employers from the prohibition, and under certain circumstances also exempts private employers.
This Comment examines ambiguities that may arise under the
exemption in the EPPA that allows private employers to administer
polygraph tests as part of ongoing investigations. The Comment first
discusses polygraph testing techniques and the empirical data indicating that polygraph tests are only valid when used to investigate specific
incidents. Second, the Comment discusses the need for the legislation
that arose from widespread abuse of polygraphs by employers and the
inadequate legal remedies available to employees. Third, after explaining the general provisions of the Act, the Comment clarifies some specific ambiguities within the "ongoing investigation exemption" 4 by
referring to legislative history and agency regulations. Finally, after
examining Congress' intentions and the impact of various constructions on employers and employees, the Comment suggests that any
other ambiguities should be resolved in favor of employers who make
a good faith effort to comply with the Act.
I. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (to be
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2006).
2. S. REP. No. 284, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprintedin 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 734 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
3. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the exemptions.
4. This exemption provides that:
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The polygraph is one of several "lie detector" devices,5 but is the
only one private employers may utilize under the EPPA. 6 The scientific principle behind polygraphs is that lying induces anxiety, which
causes variations in the skin's electrical conductivity, as measured by
perspiration, as well as changes in blood pressure and respiratory patterns.7 The changes are measured and recorded by a pen register onto
a chart which is interpreted by an examiner.
In recent years, the use of polygraphs has increased dramatically.'
Immediately before the enactment of the EPPA more than two million
tests were administered each year,9 over ninety percent of them by
private employers.' 0 Private employers used polygraphs in three
ways. Approximately seventy percent of the tests given by private
employers were preemployment tests designed to identify job applicants with dishonest tendencies." Roughly fifteen percent of the tests
were postemployment screening tests of randomly selected current
employees, and fifteen percent were given to current employees in connection with investigations of specific losses resulting from employee
theft or other misconduct.' 2
[T]his Act shall not prohibit an employer from requesting an employee to submit to a
polygraph test if(1) the test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation involving
economic loss or injury to the employer's business, such as theft, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or an act of unlawful industrial espionage or sabotage;
the employee had access to the property that is the subject of the investigation;

(2)

(3) the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the
incident or activity under investigation; and
(4)

the employer executes a statement, provided to the examinee before the test ....

Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, § 7(d), 102 Stat. 646, 649.
5. Lie detector is defined by the EPPA to include deceptographs, voice stress analyzers,
psychological stress evaluators, or any similar device used to diagnose honesty or dishonesty. Id.
§ 2(3), 102 Stat. at 646.
6. See id. § 7(d)-(f), 102 Stat. at 649-50.
7.

Hurd, Use of the Polygraph in Screening Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 529, 530 (1985).

8. The number of polygraph tests given has tripled in the last ten years. H.R. REP. No. 208,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
9.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.

10. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
11.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46.

12. Id.
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The accuracy of polygraph tests varies depending on the questioning
technique used. 3 One technique, the relevant/irrelevant ("R/I")
technique,' 4 is used for preemployment and random postemployment
screening tests. A different technique, the control question ("CQ")
technique,1 5 is used for specific incident testing. Psychologists have
recognized many problems with the R/I technique and generally place
little confidence in it.' 6 This lack of confidence is supported by the
Office of Technology Assessment's ("OTA") finding that no scientific
field evidence justifies the use of polygraphs to screen job applicants or
randomly screen employees." Thus, it is not surprising that few scien-

tists support the use of polygraphs in screening situations. The CQ
technique was developed in response to the problematic R/I technique' 8 and has been studied extensively. 9 The OTA Report, which
Congress relied upon when drafting the EPPA,2 ° concluded that polygraph examiners can detect deception at a rate better than chance
when the CQ technique is used to investigate specific incidents. 2' For
13. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH
TESTING-A RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION 25 (1983) [hereinafter OTA STUDY]. One
should not attempt to arrive at a single, simple opinion of the validity of polygraphs. Id. at 4.
14. Relevant questions concern past behavior patterns an employer considers important to
the hiring decision. These questions are interspersed with irrelevant questions about which the
subject would have no motive to lie. Deceptive subjects are assumed to have a greater reaction,
as measured by the polygraph instruments, to the relevant questions than to the irrelevant
questions. The assumption is that truthful subjects should have an equal response to all
questions because they are not lying and have nothing to fear. Id. at 17-18.
15. The relevant questions under the CQ technique address specific incidents. Unlike the R/I
technique, this technique also includes deliberately vague control questions which involve
deviant acts almost everyone may have committed at some time. It is assumed that almost all
subjects will display anxiety when answering these control questions. Examiners then compare
subjects' reactions to the relevant questions with their reactions to the control questions. If the
reaction is stronger to the relevant questions than to the control questions, the subject is
diagnosed as deceptive. Id. at 19.
16. Id. at 17. Because the intent of the various questions is transparent, the relevant questions
are likely to be arousing for truthful as well as for deceptive subjects. Also, because the questions
are generally not reviewed with the subject before the exam under the R/I method, subjects may
be aroused due to surprise or misunderstanding. Finally, subjects' reactions are more likely to be
reduced by drugs or personality quirks with the R/I technique than with other techniques. Id.;
see also Saxe, Dougherty & Cross, The Validity of Polygraph Testing-Scientific Analysis and
Public Controversy, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 355, 357 (1985).
17. OTA STUDY, supra note 13, at 58. Field studies investigate the use of actual polygraph
examinations and constitute the most direct evidence for polygraph test validity. Id. at 47.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 97. The results of these studies greatly differ due both to methodological variations
among studies and to variations in factors such as examiner training, orientation, and experience.
Id. at 96.
20. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
21. OTA STUDY, supra note 13, at 97. The OTA identified six prior reviews of such research,
with the validity ranging from 64% to 98% correct detection of guilty subjects. The OTA also
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this reason, although significant error rates are possible,"

many

23
employers consider the polygraph useful as an investigative tool.

B.

The Need for Federal Legislation

Widespread abuse of polygraphs by employers, coupled with the
lack of adequate legal remedies for job applicants and employees,
finally compelled Congress to adopt the EPPA and provide a uniform
national standard. 24 The primary abuse was that roughly eighty-five
percent of the polygraph tests given were screening tests which have
no proven validity.
Other problems resulted from inadequately
trained or inexperienced examiners, tests that were too brief, and irrelevant but intrusive personal questions.
Despite these problems, many private employees lacked an adequate
legal remedy prior to the enactment of the EPPA.2 6 Under the federal
Constitution and most state constitutions, state action must be
involved before due process or privacy provisions apply. 27 Constitutional provisions therefore provide little protection for private employees. State laws protect some private employees from polygraph abuse,
but not others. 2 ' A few states prohibit private employers from requirreviewed ten individual field studies with correct guilty detections averaging 86.3% and false
positives (innocent persons labeled deceptive) averaging 19.1%. Fourteen analog or laboratory
studies were also.reviewed. The correct guilty detections averaged 63.7% and the false positives
averaged 14.1%. Id.
22. It has been estimated that at least 400,000 honest workers were incorrectly labeled as
deceptive each year prior to the EPPA. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41. The EPPA will
eliminate many of these incorrect determinations by eliminating the large majority of polygraph
tests. Because there still will be false positives numbering in the thousands, it might have been
wise for Congress to ban polygraphs completely. This Comment, however, is limited to
interpreting the EPPA as enacted.
23. For instance, the National Restaurant Association stated that it would support the
legislation only if specific incident polygraph testing were allowed. 134 CONG. REC. S 1797 (daily
ed. Mar. 3, 1988).
24. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46. Almost fifty bills relating to polygraph testing
were introduced from the Ninety-third through the Ninety-ninth Congresses, but none passed.
Id. at 44.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
26. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46.
27. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688-91 (2d ed. 1988); see

also, State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153, 156 (1985) (privacy protection of Montana state
constitution is available only if state action is involved and noting same requirement under every
other state constitution).
28. This lack of a uniform standard was confusing to employers as well as employees. Thus,
one reason for the Act was to provide a uniform national standard to clarify the law and protect
employers from the growing number of suits related to polygraphs. HOUSE REPORT, supra note
8, at 6.

Employee Polygraph Protection Act
ing or requesting employees to submit to polygraph tests.2 9 Other
states prohibit compulsory tests, but allow employers to request, and
perhaps subtly pressure, employees to submit to tests.30 In the
remaining states, employers are not prohibited from requesting or
requiring employees to take polygraph tests. These states either have
no polygraph laws, 1 or merely regulate examiner conduct.
State laws that do restrict polygraphs often provide employees with
inadequate protection. The absence of a uniform national standard
allowed many employers to circumvent state restrictions by testing
employees in neighboring states. 32 Also, state laws are often unenforced and many provide no private cause of action to employees. 33
Therefore, federal legislation was needed to adequately protect private
employees.
II. THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT
A.

The General Scope of the EPPA

The EPPA generally prohibits preemployment and random postemployment screening tests, and regulates specific incident tests to eliminate the abuses caused by improper test administration. 34 Therefore,
in most instances employers are forbidden to require, ask, or cause any
employee or applicant to take any form of lie detector test. This
prohibition, however, is not absolute. The Act carves out exemptions
from the prohibition for certain employers. 36 These exemptions may
not be utilized by some employers, however, because state laws and
collective bargaining agreements that more comprehensively restrict
employers from administering lie detector tests are not preempted by
the Act.3 7
The Secretary of Labor is responsible for enforcing the Act 38 and
has issued interim final rules and regulations to enable employers and
29. See, ag., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51g (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
30. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
31. Seven states, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and
Wyoming, have no laws regulating or restricting the use of polygraphs.
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id. at 39.
35. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 3, 102 Stat. at 646-47.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 42-49 for a description of these exemptions. An
employee may waive the rights provided by the EPPA only as part of a settlement of a complaint
under the statute. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 6(d), 102 Stat. at 648.
37. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 10, 102 Stat. at 653.
38. See id. § 5, 102 Stat. at 647.
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polygraph examiners to comply. 39 Employers who fail to comply may
be assessed civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation. 4 The
Act also gives employees a private right of action for legal and equitable remedies.4 1
B.

Exemptions from the General Prohibitionof Lie Detector Testing

1.

Governmental Employer/FederalContractorExemptions

Government employers at all levels, federal contractors who contract with private individuals for counterintelligence services, and Federal Bureau of Investigation contractors are completely exempted
from the EPPA's prohibition.4 2 Government employers were
exempted on the theory that their employees may invoke constitutional protection.4 3 Federal contractors were exempted because of the
country's compelling interest in national security.'
2. Private Employer Exemptions
The remaining exemptions allow private employers to use
polygraphs if certain requirements are met.45 Two of these exemptions are aimed at particular industries. One allows employers who
provide security services to protect valuables or public health and
safety to request job applicants to submit to polygraph tests.46 The
other allows employers who manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances to request all job applicants who would have "direct
39. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,494 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801) (interim final rules).
40. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 6(a)(1), (3), 102 Stat. at 647. The court has
discretion on the amount of the penalty depending on an employer's record and the degree of
violation. Id. § 6(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 647.
41. Id. § 6(c)(1), 102 Stat. at 648. Relief may include, but is not limited to, employment,
reinstatement, promotion, lost wages and benefits, and attorney fees. Id.
42. See id. § 7(a)-(c), 102 Stat. at 648-49. These exemptions allow any form of lie detector
test, not just polygraphs.
43. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 47; see e.g., Texas State Employees Union v. Texas
Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987) (mandatory
polygraph policy struck down for violating privacy provisions of the Texas Constitution).
44. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48.
45. Congress gave no rationale for the seemingly double standard that permits the
government to use any form of lie detector while permitting private employers to use only
polygraphs.
46. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(e), 102 Stat. at 649-50. The rationale for
this exemption is very similar to the rationale for the governmental exemptions, as private
security firms also fulfill public interest needs. See 133 CONG. REC. H9560-65 (daily ed. Nov. 4.
1987).
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access" to controlled substances to submit to a test.4 7 Under this latter exemption, employers may also test any current employees having
"access" to controlled substances as part of an investigation of misconduct that resulted in, or will potentially result in, a loss or injury to the
employer.48
A third exemption, the ongoing investigation exemption, allows any
private employer to request employees to submit to a polygraph test if
four conditions are met: (1) the test is part of an ongoing investigation
of an economic loss or injury to the employer's business; (2) the
employee had access to the property in question; (3) the employer has
a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved; and (4) the
employer provides the employee with a written statement before the
9
4

test.

3. Restrictions on Private Employer Exemptions
The EPPA restricts private employers' ability to take adverse
employment action against employees based on permissible polygraph
tests. Neither the results of a test nor the refusal to take a test allowed
under the security services or drug exemption may be the "sole basis"
for adverse employment action. 0 For a test allowed under the "ongoing investigation" exemption, no adverse employment action may be
taken without "additional supporting evidence."'"
47. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(f)(2)(A), 102 Stat. at 650. The controlled
substance must be listed in schedule I, II, III, or IV of 21 U.S.C. § 812. Id. § 7(f)(1), 102 Stat. at
650.
This exemption was granted because members of Congress believed that the inordinate amount
of internal theft in this industry and the growing drug abuse problem in our society outweighed
employees' privacy needs. 133 CONG. REc. H9572-78 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987).
48. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(f)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 650. The higher standard
of "direct access" requires the prospective applicant to have direct and constant involvement
with the substances before a polygraph may be requested. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1988) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801). The "access" standard merely requires the current employee to
have "infrequent, random, or opportunistic access." Id.
49. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(d), 102 Stat. at 649; see supra note 4 for the full
text of this exemption. The regulations issued by the Department of Labor elaborate on these
requirements and are essential to a full understanding of them. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,494 (1988)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
50. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 8(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 650-51. There must be at least
one other basis for employment decisions in addition to the results of or the refusal to take a
polygraph test. Other bases may be that the applicant has inadequate education or lacks the
proper experience for the job. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
51. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 8(a)(1), 102 Stat. at 650. Any confessions during a
test or evidence required as a prerequisite to a test under this exemption may constitute the
additional supporting evidence of employee guilt necessary for legal termination. 53 Fed. Reg.
41,504 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801). Information obtained from the test may be

667

Washington Law Review

Vol. 64:661, 1989

The procedures for administering polygraph tests are also prescribed by the Act. Examinees have the right to terminate tests at any
time, may not be asked irrelevant personal questions concerning religion, racial matters, politics, sexual behavior, or union activities,5 2 and
must be informed of the legal ramifications of the test.5 3 Employers
must fully inform examinees of the nature and circumstances of the
test and provide them with an opportunity to review, before the test,
all questions the examiner will ask.54 The test must be at least ninety
minutes long, and must be given by an examiner who has conducted
fewer than five tests that day. 55 All examiners must be licensed by the
state in which they operate if that state requires licensing, and must
maintain a $50,000 bond or an equivalent amount of professional liability coverage. 51
III.

INTERPRETING THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION
EXEMPTION

The ongoing investigation exemption deserves close attention
because it may enable any private employer to legally request a polygraph test. Congress, after weighing both employers' and employees'
needs, decided to allow the use of polygraphs as investigative tools in
connection with ongoing investigations of specific incidents.57 Three
factors influenced this policy decision. First, employee theft is a major
burden on American businesses.58 Second, members of Congress were
persuaded by the evidence of the polygraph's increased validity when
disclosed only to the subject, the employer, or pursuant to a court order. Employee Polygraph
Protection Act § 9, 102 Stat. at 652-53.
52. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 8(b), 102 Stat. at 651-52.
53. For instance, employees must be informed that their statements may constitute the
additional supporting evidence necessary for adverse employment action. Employees must also
be informed of the legal rights and remedies available under the Act if the test is not legal. Id.
§ 8(b)(2)(D)(ii)-(v), 102 Stat. at 651.
54. Id. § 8(b)(2)(B), (E), 102 Stat. at 651-52.
55. Id. § 8(b)(2)(5), 102 Stat. at 652.
56. Id. § 8(c)(1), 102 Stat. at 652. More stringent requirements for examiners, such as
successful completion of an approved formal training course and a six month internship, were in
the original Senate bill, but were not included in the final draft. See SENATE REPORT, supra note
2, at 34.
57. See supra note 4 for the complete text of the exemption.
58. Estimates of annual losses from employee theft range as high as 40 billion annually. 134
CONG. REC. H3729 (daily ed. June 1, 1988) (statement of Rep. Martinez); Bar Lie-Detector Use
by Private Firms U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 3, 1986, at 81 (interview with Larry
Talley, vice president of risk management, Days Inns of America). The Small Business
Administration estimates 50% of business failures are due to theft, and 60% of business theft is
attributable to employees. Economics Division, Cong. Res. Serv., Polygraph Testing: Employee
and Employer Rights 2 (1988).
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focused on specific incidents. 9 Finally, Congress believed the Act
contained ample regulatory measures to limit abuse of tests administered under the exemptions.60 Thus, Congress gave private employers
permission to continue using polygraph tests as investigative tools and
to deter employee theft.6 1
Four of the elements of the ongoing investigation exemption are
ambiguous. These elements are: (1) an "ongoing investigation"; (2) a
specific "economic loss or injury"; (3) "access ' by the employee; and
(4) a "reasonable suspicion" of employee involvement.6 2 The EPPA
does not define these elements. The regulations issued by the Department of Labor provide employers with some guidance6 3 but are not
comprehensive enough to resolve all possible ambiguities.
The first part of this analysis will reveal some specific ambiguities in
the elements of the ongoing investigation exemption, and resolve them
by referring to the legislative history and the regulations. The second
part of the analysis, by examining the purposes of the Act and the
impact of various constructions, reveals why courts may want to construe any other ambiguities broadly in order to avoid employer
liability.
A.

Ambiguities in the Ongoing Investigation Exemption

1.

Tests Must be Given as Part of Ongoing Investigations

The EPPA requires that every test administered under the ongoing
investigation exemption be given "in connection with an ongoing
investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's business."" Neither the Act nor the legislative history precisely defines an
ongoing investigation. One Labor Department regulation, which finds
support in the Senate Report, requires that investigations be of specific
incidents or activities.6 5 Because this guideline prevents "continuous"
59. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; 134 CONG. REC. H3728 (daily ed. June 1,
1988); 133 CONG. REc. H9580 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987).
60. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; 133 CONG. REc. H9580 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987);
see also Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 8, 102 Stat. at 650-51.
61. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 46.
62. These four elements are contained in the first three provisions of the exemption. Once
these elements are satisfied, employers must comply with the fourth provision by providing
examinees with a written statement before testing them. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act

§ 7(d)(4), 102 Stat. at 649.
63. See generally 53 Fed. Reg. 41,494-95 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
64. See supra note 4 (quoting the ongoing investigation exemption).
65. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 801); SENATE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 48.
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investigations, employers may not request polygraph tests merely
because a shortage is discovered during regular inventory counts.6 6
Some factual situations, however, will fall somewhere between
shortages discovered in regular inventory counts and immediately
recognizable thefts of large-ticket items. If employers suspect petty
thefts are occurring, but exact times when the items were taken cannot
be pinpointed, they might set up special procedures to count inventory
at shorter than normal intervals to increase the odds of detection.
Neither the legislative history of the Act nor the regulations indicate
whether this practice would meet the ongoing investigation element.
Due to the general policy reasons discussed later in the analysis,67
however, courts should resolve this ambiguity in favor of employers

and avoid imposing liability.6

611

2. Economic Loss or Injury

The ongoing investigation exemption further requires that there be
an "economic loss or injury to the employer's business."6 9 This ele-

ment is more clearly stated than the others,7" but at least one ambiguity needs to be resolved: whether the employee's act must cause the
employer to suffer an immediate loss or injury, or whether the
66. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 801).
67. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
68. Allowing polygraph testing under these circumstances will not decrease the reliability of
the tests because the CQ technique still may be utilized and examinees still may be asked about
specific incidents. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the CQ
technique.
69. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(d)(1), 102 Stat. at 649. Examples of incidents
meeting this element include theft or misappropriation from the employer, industrial espionage
or sabotage, check-kiting, money laundering, and theft from property managed by the employer.
See id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1988) [hereinafter CONFERENCE
REPORT]; 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
70. Two substantial limits inherent in the economic loss or injury element are indicated by the
legislative history and the regulations. First, the loss or injury must be the result of an
intentional wrongdoing. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
Therefore, losses stemming from unintentional acts, such as automobile or workplace accidents,
do not satisfy this element. Id.; see also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69. at 12. Second,
the Act also requires that the loss or injury be "to the employer's business." Employee
Polygraph Protection Act § 7(d)(1), 102 Stat. at 649. The Administration made a plea to
Congress to expand the ongoing investigation exemption to allow investigation of serious
workplace problems that threaten not only material loss to employers, but also the health, safety,
or well-being of other employees. 134 CONG. REC. S1797 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1988). Congress,
however, made no amendment to the Act in response to the plea. Therefore, although
misconduct by employees against coworkers indirectly may cause losses to employers in the form
of increased insurance premiums or higher turnover rates, such actions should not be found to
satisfy this element.

670
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employee's act must merely create the possibility of loss or injury to
the employer at some future date.
Nothing in the Act or the regulations requires employers to demonstrate an immediate loss or injury. Some incidents of employee misconduct should be vigorously investigated by employers even though
they may realize a short-term economic gain.7 1 For example, if a broker in an investment firm violates insider trading laws, the employer
may receive a short-term gain in the form of increased commissions.
The employer, however, also risks a loss resulting from liability for the
employee's actions 72 or damage to the employer's reputation. In the
absence of a specific requirement that any loss be immediate, and
because employers are often in an excellent position to detect certain
white collar crimes committed by employees, courts should not interpret this element to require proof of an immediate loss or injury to the
employer.
3. Access to the Properti
The ongoing investigation exemption also requires that employees
73
have "access to the property that is the subject of the investigation"
before testing is permissible. Although the term "access" is not
defined by the statute, legislative history and the regulations provide
some guidance. 4 One regulation concerning the ongoing investigation
exemption defines access as "the opportunity ... to cause, or to aid or
abet in causing, the specific economic loss or injury."' 75 Thus, direct
physical contact with the property by the employee is not a necessary
element of access.7 6

An ambiguity left unresolved by the regulations is whether mere
physical opportunity to enter an area satisfies the access element, or
whether employees must also have authorization to enter the area.
71.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 12.

72. See Insider Trading and Security Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
§ 21A(a)(3), 102 Stat. 4677, 4678. A similar instance would be if an employee steals a trade
secret from a competitor to impress his or her employer. Although the theft may result in a
short-term gain for the employer, the employee's illegal act still should meet the "injury"
requirement.
73. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(d)(2), 102 Stat. at 649.
74. The term "access" also is used in the drug exemption. Prospective employees must have
"direct access," while current employees only must have "access." Id. § 7(f)(2)(A), (B), 102
Stat. at 650.
75. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 801).
76. Id. For example, knowledge of the combination of a safe constitutes "access" because it
provides an opportunity to take the property contained in the safe. Access to inventory records
also meets the requirement because it enables one to alter inventory records, which may aid and
abet the actual thief. Id.

671
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The regulation defining access under the ongoing investigation exemption indicates that physical opportunity alone, although not necessary,
is sufficient to satisfy this element.7 7 The regulations, however, give
examples indicating that the Department of Labor could interpret
access more narrowly to also require employer authorization.78
This latter interpretation is not supported by the legislative history.
The conference committee, while discussing the "reasonable suspicion" element, stated that access alone does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of employee misconduct.7 9 The committee went on to
say, however, that the "unauthorized or unusual" nature of the access
may be grounds for reasonable suspicion."0 The conference committee's statement strongly implies not only that access may exist without
authorization, but also that access without authorization gives
employers more justification to test an employee. Thus, testing should
not be precluded simply because employees do not have authorized
access to the property in question.
Interpreting the access element to require authorization would be
unfair for two additional reasons. First, the authorization requirement
is not explicitly stated as a rule, but is only implied in examples. If the
Department of Labor intends to interpret access in this manner, it
should expressly state this intention instead of forcing employers to
guess how the term will be interpreted."' Second, the Department's
implied interpretation requiring authorization does not correspond to
the ordinary meaning of access."2 Many judges have approved of the
"meaning" criterion as a general standard for interpreting statutes.8 3
The Department's "opportunity to cause" definition of access given in
77. See id.
78. The regulation concerning the ongoing investigation exemption states as an example that
"all employees working in or with authorityto enter a warehouse storage area have 'access' to the
property." Id. (emphasis added). An example given in the regulations concerning the drug
exemption provides an even stronger indication, stating that personnel whose duties do not
permit or require entrance into an area do not have access. Id. at 41,501.
79. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 13. For an explanation of the reasonable
suspicion element, see infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
80. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 13 (emphasis added). This language is also
contained in the regulations. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 801).
81. This unfairness is compounded by the fact that the example most indicative that the
Department may require authorization is in the regulations dealing with the drug exemption, and
not in the regulations dealing with the ongoing investigation exemption. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
82. Something is "accessible" if it "can be got" or is "obtainable." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 8 (2d college ed. 1986).
83. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.07, at 29 (Singer 4th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. Statutory terms should be interpreted according to what the general
public will understand them to mean. Id. § 45.08, at 31.
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the regulations meets this criterion because it corresponds with how
the general public would ordinarily interpret the term. In contrast,
the Department's examples indicate that employees who are not
authorized to enter an area do not have access to the property within
the area. This latter interpretation does not correspond to the ordinary meaning of access and therefore violates the "meaning" criterion.84 The Department's interpretation is also contrary to common
sense, because dishonest employees are unlikely to be deterred by a
lack of authorization if they have a physical opportunity to take the

property in question.
Thus, employers should not be held to violate the Act for testing
employees who have "opportunistic" but not "authorized" access.
The legislative history contradicts the Department's interpretation of
access, and employers could be subjected to severe monetary penalties
simply because they could not sort out the Department's vague and
Courts should not be bound by an example
conflicting examples."
that can only be found in a regulation unrelated to the ongoing investigation exemption.8 6
4. Reasonable Suspicion
A fourth element of the ongoing investigation exemption requires
employers to have a "reasonable suspicion that the employee was
involved" in the misconduct before polygraph testing is permissible.8 7
Although the legislative history does not reveal the purpose of this
element, it no doubt is intended to prevent the unreasonable physical
and psychological intrusions that result from random testing. When
construing this element, courts will not be able to look to other federal
84. For example, if money is missing from an employer's safe, and the safe combination is
found in the suspected employee's pocket, the employer surely will believe that the employee had
"access" to the property despite the employee's lack of authorization.
85. See infra note 104 for a discussion of the possible damages.
86. Legislative regulations such as these have the force of law, State v. Department of Health
& Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1981), and courts may invalidate them only if
they are patently arbitrary and capricious. United Mine Workers v. Kleppe, 561 F.2d 1258, 1263
(7th Cir. 1977). However, the authorization requirement is not stated as a regulation but is
merely conveyed in an example to display the agency's interpretation of its own regulation.
Although it is settled law that great deference is to be given to agency interpretations of their
regulations, the primary rationale for this doctrine is to defer to an agency's expertise. Southern
Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Agency interpretations are
given much less weight when they do not concern an issue particularly within the agency's field
of expertise. Id. As the Department of Labor has no special expertise to interpret the term
"access," courts should not feel bound by the agency's example.
If courts believe that they are bound, the regulations should be changed or clarified by the
Department to adequately notify employers how the term will be interpreted.
87. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(d)(3), 102 Stat. at 649.
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statutes because the term "reasonable suspicion" is not used in any
other federal statute. Case law discussing the fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution, however, could provide some guidance
to the courts.
The fourth amendment generally precludes arrests or searches of
citizens unless there is "probable cause" that would lead a reasonable
person to believe that the suspect had committed a crime." Although
courts have interpreted the term "reasonable grounds" in criminal
statutes to be the equivalent of probable cause as used in the fourth
amendment,8 9 it would be erroneous to similarly construe the reasonable suspicion element of the EPPA. Cases dealing with the fourth
amendment have specifically used the term reasonable suspicion as a
distinct and less demanding legal standard than probable cause. 90
Other indicia demonstrate that reasonable suspicion is distinguishable from probable cause. Although Congress has used the terms
"probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" in other federal statutes,
the EPPA is the only federal statute to use the term "reasonable suspicion." Therefore, it is logical to infer that reasonable suspicion was
intended to mean something other than probable cause or reasonable
grounds. A review of the EPPA's legislative history reveals a striking
similarity between the definition of reasonable suspicion given by the
conference committee and the definitions expressed in fourth amendment case law. 9 ' The Senate Report also acknowledged that the
EPPA offered less protection to employees than is given to criminal
92
suspects by the fourth amendment.
88. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). The fourth amendment
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . .. against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
.... U.S. .CONST. amend. IV.
89. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 478 n.6 (construing Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7607 (1982) (repealed 1984)); see also United States v. Green, 525 F.2d 386, 389-90 (8th Cir.
1975) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1982)).
90. Probable cause is not an absolute requirement for a valid search. The fundamental
command of the fourth amendment is that searches be "reasonable," and in some cases a warrant
and probable cause are not required. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the interests of
the parties, and in some circumstances searches may be based on reasonablesuspicions that do
not rise to the level of probable cause. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)
(emphasis added) (school officials may search a student's purse if justified by reasonable
suspicion, despite lack of probable cause).
91. The Conference Committee intended the terms to refer to "some observable, articulable
basis in fact," CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 13, and the Department of Labor
adopted this definition in the regulations. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 801). Case law has similarly defined the terms. E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702
(1983) ("reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts"); Hunter v. Auger, 672
F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982) ("specific objective facts and rational inferences").
92. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 48-49.
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Assuming that courts accept reasonable suspicion as a standard distinct from probable cause, they must still determine whether employers have satisfied this element. Some courts have interpreted the
reasonable suspicion standard to be easily satisfied.93 The regulations,
however, partially offset this interpretation by requiring employers to
bear the burden of proving that a reasonable suspicion exists. 94
Employers must also give employees a written statement of the basis
for suspicion before conducting polygraph tests.95 The legislative history and the regulations provide examples of what may satisfy the reasonable suspicion element. Information from a coworker, the
demeanor of the employee, and inconsistent statements by an
employee are all grounds for reasonable suspicion.9 6 Mere access to
the property in question does not constitute a sufficient basis for suspicion. Unusual circumstances surrounding the access, however, such
as its unauthorized nature, may go towards proving reasonable suspicion. 97 These examples indicate that proving reasonable suspicion was
not intended to be a particularly onerous task for employers. Therefore, if employers have a clearly articulated reason to suspect an
employee and can reduce it to writing, they should be found to have
satisfied this element, even if their suspicion falls short of probable
cause.
B.

Ambiguities in the Ongoing Investigation Exemption Should Be
Broadly Construed

Some ambiguities in the ongoing investigation exemption cannot be
resolved by examining specific statements in the legislative history or
the regulations.9 8 Therefore, courts may have to consider generalized
arguments such as the legislative intent of the exemption, the impact a
narrow or broad construction will have on employers and employees,
93. A police officer was found to have reasonable suspicion to stop a truck and investigate
because the truck appeared to be heavily loaded down, was in an area known for drug trafficking,
and the windows of the canopy were covered with heavy quilts rather than curtains. United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985).
94. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
95. Employee Polygraph Protection Act § 7(d)(4), 102 Stat. at 649. Thus, inarticulable
hunches should not constitute reasonable suspicion under the EPPA. As one court has
eloquently stated, reasonable suspicion may not be the product of "mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity." People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 74 (1975).
96. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801); see also CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 69, at 13.
97. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801).
98. One such instance is whether special inventory procedures satisfy the "ongoing
investigation" element. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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and the effect a particular construction will have on the future use of
the exemption.
1. A Broad Reading of the Ambiguous PrerequisitesMost Effectively
Harmonizes the Various Intentions of Congress
The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intentions of the legislature. 99 Congress' purpose when
enacting the general prohibition on polygraphs undoubtedly was to
protect employees' rights. Another reason for the prohibition was to
protect employers from the growing number of lawsuits related to
polygraph testing."° If these were the only intentions of Congress,
however, these intentions would have been best served by an absolute
ban on all polygraph tests. But instead of implementing an absolute
ban, Congress balanced employees' rights against employers' need to
fight internal theft and determined that the ongoing investigation
exemption was necessary to provide employers with a tool to fight this
theft. 1o

To prevent the imposition of liability on employers who in good
faith attempt to comply with the EPPA, courts could broadly construe
the ambiguities in the ongoing investigation exemption. Although a
broad construction would impinge somewhat on the protection offered
to employees under the Act, this impingement would be minimal in
light of the fact that only a small portion of pre-EPPA polygraph tests
were related to specific incidents. 10 2 In contrast, a narrow construction of the ongoing investigation exemption could greatly frustrate the
legislature's intent to provide employers with a tool to fight employee
theft. The number of good faith violators of the Act would immediately increase with a narrow construction.10 3 As employers learn of
these unintentional violations and the substantial damages incurred as
99. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) (Congress did not intend the Amtrak Act to authorize suits by private parties);
SUTHERLAND, supra note 83, § 45.05, at 21.
100. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6, 8.
101. The Senate Report indicates that business users of the polygraph made a plausible
argument that the threat of a polygraph test acts as a deterrent to employee theft and that the
ongoing investigation exemption is meant to preserve this use of the test. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 46.
102. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for statistics concerning the various uses
of polygraph tests before the Act.
103. The number of good faith violators also may be increased because the employer has the
burden of proving "reasonable suspicion," 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (1988) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 801), and probably the other requirements as well. See United States v. First City Nat'l
Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967) (one who claims the benefits of an exception to a
statutory prohibition generally must carry the burden of proof on the issue).
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a result," ° they are likely to conclude that the exemption is too risky
to use at all. A narrow construction of the exemption would also frustrate the legislature's intent to protect employers from the increasing
number of lawsuits concerning polygraphs.10 Such a construction
would increase the number of good faith violators, thereby increasing
the number of legal actions against employers. This is precisely contrary to what Congress wanted. A broad reading of the elements of
the ongoing investigation exemption would therefore most effectively
harmonize Congress' intentions to protect employees, provide employ-

ers with a tool to fight internal theft, and clarify the legality of polygraph tests to decrease the number of lawsuits against employers.

2. The Remedial Nature of the EPPA Does Not Require Courts To
Construe the Exemption Narrowly
10 6
Because the EPPA fits the description of a remedial statute,
plaintiffs will undoubtedly argue that the ongoing investigation exemption should be narrowly construed. Statutory construction rules state
that remedial statutes should be interpreted broadly, with any exemptions therefore narrowly construed.107 Maxims of narrow and broad
statutory construction, however, are subordinate to the general principle that statutes should be construed to accomplish legislative
104. Although the civil penalties may be decreased substantially for employers who act in
good faith, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,507 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801), private civil suits
could create substantial liability for employers. Although similar federal statutes often do not
allow the recovery of compensatory damages such as emotional distress, Vazques v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (lst Cir. 1978) (construing Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)), violations of the EPPA may. The enforcement provisions of
the Act were not intended to deprive employees of any remedy available to them prior to the Act.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 14.
Under state law, damages for emotional distress are recoverable for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy because wrongful discharge is an intentional tort. See, e.g., Cagle v.
Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911, 918, 726 P.2d 434, 437 (1986). Furthermore, the
employees only need to show they have suffered emotional distress, not that their employer
intended the distress or could have foreseen it. 106 Wash. 2d at 919-20, 726 P.2d at 438-39.
State anti-polygraph statutes have already been recognized as statements of public policy, Perks
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir. 1979), and employees have won
large awards for emotional distress against employers who violated such statutes. Moniodis v.
Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985) (awarding employee who was terminated for refusing
to submit to a test $300,000 as compensation for wrongful discharge and infliction of emotional
distress), cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649. It is quite possible, therefore, that good faith
violators of the EPPA still could face substantial liability.
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. A remedial statute is intended to afford a private remedy to a person injured by a
wrongful act. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (abr. 5th ed. 1983).
107. E.g., Staten Island Rapid Tiansit Operating Auth. v. ICC, 718 F.2d 533, 541 (2d Cir.
1983).
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intent."°8 Because a narrow reading of this exemption would substantially undermine its purpose, and a broad reading would impinge only
marginally on Congress' intention to protect employees, 10 9 the rule of
narrowly construing exemptions to remedial statutes should not be
applied to the ong3ing investigation exemption.
Additionally, a narrow construction of the exemption would harm
employers considerably more than it would benefit employees. The
potential harm to good faith employers from a narrow construction is
substantial considering the liabilities that may be incurred.t"' In contrast, for two reasons, a narrow construction would not substantially
increase the protection offered to employees by the Act. First, a narrow construction of the exemption is unlikely to substantially reduce
the number of tests because specific incident testing was not widespread before the EPPA was enacted.Il' Second, the arguably permissible tests eliminated by a narrow construction would be no less
reliable than tests clearly legal under the exemption because the more
reliable CQ technique could still be utilized." 2 Therefore, courts
should not construe the exemption narrowly solely because of the
remedial nature of the Act. Instead, if ambiguities cannot be resolved
by reference to legislative history or the regulations, courts should
construe them broadly to avoid the unfairness to employers that could
result from a narrow construction.
3.

A Broad Reading of the Ongoing Investigation Exemption Will
Not Defeat the Purposes of the EPPA

A broad construction of the ongoing investigation exemption will
not lead to abusive practices by employers. The primary risk of abuse
inherent in a broad construction of the exemption is that employers
will attempt to use the exemption as a pretext for random postemployment testing. Congress intended the prerequisites of the exemption to
prevent this practice. A broad construction of these prerequisites,
however, will not encourage employers to attempt to continue random
108. Derengowski v. United States, 404 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1968) (maxim of strict
construction may not be used to defeat the legislative intent), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969).
See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 83, § 58.01, at 705-06.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
110. See supra note 104 for a discussion of damages.
11l. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12 for the statistics on polygraph use before the
Act. Also, the prohibition of preemployment and random postemployment screening tests
probably will not increase employers' desire to employ specific incident testing. See infra note
113 and accompanying text.
112. This statement assumes that a specific incident truly exists. See supra notes 15-23 and
accompanying text for a description of the CQ technique.
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postemployment testing. Because random testing of current employees
was not extremely popular with employers before the Act, 1 3 it is
unlikely that a broad construction of the exemption will cause many
employers to risk liability in order to continue random testing. The
possible magnitude of this liability further decreases the probability
that employers will attempt to use this exemption as a pretext for random postemployment testing. " 4 In addition, a broad construction of
the ongoing investigation exemption will in no way affect the many
restrictions in the Act that attempt to curb abuses resulting from
5
improper testing procedures."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The EPPA generally prohibits employers from requesting employees to submit to lie detector tests. The ongoing investigation exemption, however, allows private employers to request employees to
undergo a polygraph test as part of an ongoing investigation of a specific economic loss or injury. The employee to be tested must have
had access to the property, and the employer must have a reasonable
suspicion that the particular employee was involved. The Act, however, does not expressly define these elements. A few of the ambiguities that may arise can be resolved by referring to the legislative
history and the regulations. To resolve other ambiguities, however,
courts will need to look at more generalized policy arguments.
For several reasons, these arguments should lead courts to construe
the ongoing investigation exemption broadly and avoid imposing liability on employers who make a good faith effort to comply with the
Act. First, the protection provided to employees by the Act will be
only marginally decreased by a broad construction of the exemption.
Specific incident testing is not in widespread use by employers, and
many of the tests will either be clearly illegal or legal and therefore not
affected by a broad construction. Second, if the exemption is not construed broadly, the purpose of the exemption, to provide employers
with a tool to fight internal theft, will be undermined because employers may feel it is too risky to use the exemption. Third, the arguably
legal tests allowed by a broad construction must conform to the same
113. One reason why random testing was not widespread before the EPPA may have been
because of the substantial use of preemployment screening, now banned under the EPPA. An
equally plausible explanation, however, is that employers hesitate to randomly test current
employees to avoid hostility and to ensure a favorable working environment. Note, The Working
Man's Nemesis-The Polygraph, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 94, 102 (1974).
114. See supra note 104.
115. See Section II(B)(3) for a full discussion of these procedural requirements.
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procedural standards as all other legal tests and therefore will be just
as accurate. Finally, if the exemption is not construed broadly, the
exemption could create a trap for employers. It would not be fair to
give employers permission to use polygraphs and then narrowly construe any ambiguities so that employers attempting in good faith to
comply with the Act are subject to large damage assessments.
Ryan K Brown

